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Could Wittgenstein still be held 
as a father of truth tables?
Poderia Wittgenstein ainda ser considerado 
como um pai das tabelas de verdade?
“(…) the great question is now: How should a notation [Zeichensystem] be 
constructed, which will make every tautology recognizable as a tautology 
in one and the same way? This is the fundamental problem of logic! [Dies 
ist das Grundproblem der Logik!]“
Wittgenstein, Letter to Russell, 1913
Abstract 
A recent discussion on the origins of truth tables as notational means is addressed 
in this paper. Some authors, engaged in a historical and technical investigation, 
overlook several philosophical features of Wittgenstein’s use of truth tables and its 
connections with the Tractarian Philosophy of Logic. Here, I discuss the distinction 
between a use of truth tables as a metaphysical instrument to capture the essence 
of both language and world and a secularised use, for instance, as a decision tool 
in propositional logic, without any further substantive philosophical program. The 
secularized use of truth tables, different from a Tractarian approach, is a use 
independent of any philosophical account or metaphysical constraint.
Key words: Wittgenstein; Truth tables; Tractatus; Tautology; Contradiction; 
Symbolism.
Resumo 
Neste artigo abordaremos uma discussão recente sobre a origem das tabelas de 
verdade como um tipo de notação. Alguns autores, engajados em uma investigação 
histórica e técnica, negligenciam várias características filosóficas do uso que 
Wittgenstein faz de tabelas de verdade e suas conexões com a filosofia tractariana 
da lógica. Discutiremos aqui a distinção entre o uso de tabelas de verdade como 
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um instrumento metafísico para capturar a essência da linguagem e do mundo, 
e um uso secularizado, como, por exemplo, uma ferramenta de decisão na 
lógica proposicional, sem qualquer outro programa filosófico substantivo. O uso 
secularizado de tabelas de verdade, diferente de uma abordagem tractariana, é um 
uso independente de qualquer abordagem filosófica ou restrição metafísica.
Palavras-chave: Wittgenstein, tabelas de verdade, Tractatus, tautologia, con-
tradição, simbolismo
Introduction
At the beginning of the 1990s, Shosky discovered truth-table matrices in 
Wittgenstein’s handwriting in the typed transcript of Russell’s 1912 lecture 
‘Matter: the problem stated’. He then holds them as the first traceable truth 
tables (Shosky, 1997: 22). Since then, other recent studies have disputed who 
invented truth tables, both as a logical technique and as a logical device (e.g., 
Grattan-Guinness 1997, 2005; Anellis 2004, 2012 and Beziau 2012). Illus-
trative of this discussion, Anellis (2012) defends Peirce as being the first to 
fully develop a diagrammatical representation for material implication more 
than 20 years before Wittgenstein’s Tractarian truth table.
Nonetheless, this kind of historical approach to the topic of the origin of 
truth tables very often overlooks at least three crucial points. First, although 
we may have some proof that other authors have entertained the idea of 
a tabular representation of truth-functionality, Wittgenstein explicitly held 
truth tables as his own notation1 and not as someone else’s creation (see Witt-
genstein 1929: 170-1 and Waismann 1979: 80-92). Second, the search for an 
adequate notational means plays a central metaphysical role in his early phi-
losophy. It is crucial to note that he is, at that time, not merely developing a 
1  Ramsey (1923), for example, received the Tractarian truth-table notation as a contribution to 
logic and to philosophy. He clearly takes Wittgenstein’s presentation of material implication in 
the Tractatus as original (p. 470). Furthermore, Ramsey held the Tractarian notation as sharing 
some relevant logical features with a perfect notation: “It may, of course, be doubted whether it is 
possible to formulate this rule [on logical dependence of propositions] as it seems to presuppose 
the whole of symbolic logic; but in any perfect notation it might be possible; for example in Mr. 
Wittgenstein’s notation with T’s and F’s there would be no difficulty.” (RAMSEY 1923: 472). See 
also Ramsey 1927: 164-166.
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logical device to prove the validity of some formula. He uses truth tables2 in a 
more ambitious (philosophical) way, namely – aiming at showing the essence 
of language – than, for instance, Post (1921) did. Third, Wittgenstein’s truth 
tables represent a development of his other tentative symbolisms, as some 
letters to Russell from 1913 strongly indicate3. In this respect, it is important 
to note that the Tractatus presents at least another equivalent notation (see 
6.12034)4. 
During the Tractarian period, the notational means should not just be 
a logical tool for mechanically calculating whether a molecular proposition 
is valid or not. In other words, regardless of which notational means is in 
question, for the young Wittgenstein, they should all exhibit some essential 
features of language (and then of world). For this reason, we should bring 
this discussion on the origin of truth tables back to a philosophical context 
rather than a historical one. As Hacker (1997: 46) states: “what mattered to 
Wittgenstein, however, was not primarily the decision procedure, but rather 
what the T/F notation shows about the nature of the propositions of logic and 
truth-functional operators”. The already mentioned recent works on the ori-
gin of truth tables systematically neglect that Wittgenstein, at that time, was 
not merely elaborating some technical device for calculation in logic. Rather, 
he had a very pervasive philosophical program that should also integrate 
notational means.
We can take, for instance, the Tractarian passage 5.4711 as an explicit 
example of what I am calling a metaphysical approach to the issue, which 
makes Wittgenstein’s use of it peculiar. If specifying the essence of language 
means specifying the essence of world and if we are right in maintaining that 
2  I refer here to the classical usage of truth tables outside a many-valued background. For further 
discussion on this topic, see Shramko and Wansing (2011) and Beziau (2012).
3  In fact, by discussing some of these letters, we may understand why Russell held the Tractatus 
(not surprisingly) as a project towards the construction of an ideal language in his historical and 
controversial introduction to Wittgenstein’s first book. This subject was the main issue in several 
letters between him and Wittgenstein in 1913. In this sense, these letters give further evidence 
for Shosky’s interpretation of his discovery of truth tables drawn by Wittgenstein in Russell’s 
documents from 1912.
4  All decimal numbers in the present text come from the numeration of the Tractatus (1918). 
Although Wittgenstein’s first book was published in German in Ostwald`s Annalen der Naturphilo-
sophie only in 1921, a first complete version was already to be found in the summer of 1918. For 
this historical development, see Tractatus´ critical edition, organized by Mcguinness and Schulte 
(1989).
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truth-table notation was thought to mirror the alleged essence of language, 
then by addressing the construction rules of a truth table, we are addressing 
the logic or essence of world itself: a world constituted uniquely by inde-
pendent state of affairs (1-1.21). Moreover, in the Tractarian passages 3.342 
and 3.3421, Wittgenstein strongly suggests a metaphysical connection be-
tween “das Wesen der Notation” and “das Wesen der Welt”. 
Accordingly, one may defend that the kind of factual questions of who 
exactly created truth tables and where, when and how, which, for instance, are 
at the core of Anellis’ critique (2004) of Shosky’s findings, are not decisive 
from a philosophical point of view. Here, it is rather valuable to examine the 
question of why truth tables were developed. We could also ask: to which 
kind of (philosophical) problem do they represent a reaction? This is the 
sort of answer we are aiming at. The Tractarian truth table is neither a mere 
mathematical matrix of truth values nor a simple logical technique for captur-
ing truth-functionality; rather, it represents an alternative notational system 
to grasp the alleged essence of language and world. This is the philosophical 
motivation to assess why Wittgenstein’s early philosophy was deeply marked 
by an engagement in building several notational means, which would work 
rather as a metaphysical instrument than as a mere diagrammatical device. 
In this respect, regardless of Wittgenstein being the truth-table notation’s 
real father, it is essential to draw attention to this often underestimated fact by 
the recent literature on the origins of truth tables: to work with truth tables5 
is indeed to operate with numerous tenets of the Tractarian philosophy of 
logic. As a result, common attacks against this notational means as being 
limited, for instance, may also expose direct problems of its image of logic 
as also being limited. Wittgenstein himself acknowledges, in the last pages 
of his paper Some Remarks of Logical Forms (SRLF, 1929), some patent logical 
limitation in his notation in dealing, for instance, with the logical multiplicity 
of phenomena6.
5  We refer here to the classical usage of truth tables outside a many-valued background. For 
further discussion on this topic, see Shramko and Wansing (2011) and Beziau (2012).
6  The abandonment of the truth table as an adequate notation may consequently play a crucial 
exegetical role in understanding, for instance, some problems in Wittgenstein’s intermediary 
thought. Another problem with truth-table notation is the exponentialization of its rows 
in function of the number of elementary propositions we are dealing with. This represents a 
challenge for its inspection.
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If one is familiar with truth tables, one is familiar with the peculiar Trac-
tarian metaphysics (and limitations), whether one is conscious of it or not. 
This form of tabular representation of truth conditions and truth-values of 
propositions, which is conventionally advanced today in handbooks for 
propositional calculus, was named in the Tractarian period as WF Notation. 
In 4.442, for example, Wittgenstein presents a truth table for that which 
we currently call a material implication. This passage can be held as a birth 
certificate of truth tables7. This special notation should provide a means by 
which, in one movement, one could (a) mirror the alleged deep (and hid-
den) syntax of language8, (b) fully recognise and calculate a radical difference 
between empirical (sinnvolle) and logical propositions (sinnlose Sätze) and (c) 
avoid logical nonsense. These three features, especially (a), compose what I 
hold as being a metaphysical use of truth tables. By contrast, a secularised 
use9 does not exhibit any of these features, although, using the very same 
logical devices, a secularised use of a logical tool is arguably independent, for 
instance, of any account of the essence of world. 
7  Of course, there may be other birth certificates if we do accept that they were developed, in 
different levels, quite independently by different authors such as Boole, Frege, Peirce, Schröder, 
Łukasiewicz (for an impressive tentative list, see Anellis 2012). A natural development of the pre-
sent paper would be, for instance, a direct comparison, both with a philosophical and a technical 
approach, between Post’s truth tables (1921) and the Tractatus’ truth tables developed during the 
same period but independently. Post’s use of the truth table seems to be a perfect example of what 
we call a secularized usage because it is deprived of metaphysics and of any substantive philoso-
phical program about the essence of language and world. In this paper, I concentrate my exegeti-
cal efforts on the metaphysics of truth tables using a Tractarian background. While Wittgenstein 
may not have been the first philosopher to conceive of a truth table, he was most likely the first 
to use it in association with a substantive philosophical program on the nature of language and 
the essence of the world.
8  This is not to be held in a Chomskyan sense but in the early analytic philosophy tradition sense: 
legitimate propositions have one and only one logical form; this is hidden and very complex. As a 
result, philosophers should engage in discovering this form by logical analysis. (For that, see, for 
example, Frege 1918; Russell 1918; or the Tractarian passage 4.002). 
9  I do not intend to connect metaphysics with religion here. I am simply using the term “secu-
larized” regarding some logical devices as a analogy to stress that they could be legitimately held 
as displaying no mandatory relation to any metaphysical account or substantive philosophical 
program about the essence of world. Ultimately, metaphysics, even such a peculiar one as found 
in the Tractatus, can be held as irrelevant for understanding and applying logical machinery. This 
autonomy of logical systems, in this “secularized” perspective, is also an insight that Wittgenstein 
himself developed in the 1930s. There is really nothing sacred about logical practices. However, it 
is difficult to see how Wittgenstein’s account of logic in the Tractatus could be independent of its 
ontology of elementary Sachverhalte and an absolute and unique logical space. 
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For the present investigation, I divide the text into three sections. In the 
first, I acknowledge a general Leibnizian heritage in what I call the Tractar-
ian metaphysical approach to a symbolism. The second section offers, say, 
philosophical evidence for Shosky’s discovery by exploring Wittgenstein’s 
urge to (radically) separate logical propositions from empirical propositions, 
via a perfect notation, without using degrees of evidence as a criterion. The 
final section examines some differences between a metaphysical use of the 
truth table, as exhibited in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, and a secularised 
use, focusing on some logical features such as truth-functionality, bipolar-
ity, logical independence of elementary propositions and the central role of 
tautologies.
1. Reassessing an influential metaphysical view about symbolism
We shall accommodate here the Tractarian project regarding notational means 
inside a more comprehensive Leibnizian perspective about the philosophical 
role of symbolic systems. We are not claiming any direct influence or heritage 
but rather a pervasive affinity in dealing with symbols. This is to show that 
the young Wittgenstein is not alone in his metaphysical use of a symbolism. 
Such acknowledgment is not to be found in the recent literature about truth 
tables. This view holds that our symbols, ruled in an integrated system, can 
be firm threads to the nature of things rather than inevitable obstacles to 
them. In 1678, for example, in a letter to Tschirnhaus, Leibniz maintains: 
“We do not have to fear that the contemplation of symbols will lead us away 
from things, but, on the contrary, it conducts us to their inner side”10. 
Our symbolism should indeed mirror the essence of things: by exploring 
certain signs, we can indirectly grasp the nature of a domain. Accordingly, a 
symbolism is not of supplementary importance in philosophy, but it is es-
sential for philosophical activities. We can argue that the Tractarian project 
fits well within the context of this sort of (philosophical) language optimism, 
where the elements of a notational system can and should be adequately ar-
ticulated to lead us to the interior of language, which could, in turn, express 
the logical structure of world so that our philosophical confusions dissolve 
and discussion comes to a halt.
10  “Nemo autem vereri debet, ne characterum contemplatio nos a rebus abducat, imo contra ad 
intima rerum ducet.”  (Leibniz 1918, p. 461)
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This preliminary understanding enables us, for example, to make sense of 
certain lines of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell and Frege in the Tractatus, 
when he argues that their notation could not rule out all mistakes:
To avoid these [philosophical] errors, we must employ a symbolism which 
excludes them, by not applying the same sign in different symbols and by 
not applying signs in the same way which signify in different ways. A sym-
bolism, that is to say, which obeys the rules of logical grammar—of logical 
syntax. (The logical symbolism [Begriffsschrift] of Frege and Russell is 
such a language, which, however, does still not exclude all errors.) (3.325). 
Here, it is clear that the young Wittgenstein believed that a symbolism should 
both grasp the rules of logical syntax, held as unique at this time, and avoid 
logical errors. By writing “language which does not still exclude of all errors”, 
Wittgenstein most likely meant, on the one side, the possibility, discovered by 
Russell in approximately 1901, of building inconsistent Sätze inside Grundg-
esetze’s system, which led Frege to consternation and his system to trivialisa-
tion. On the other side, we have the possibility, in Principia, of holding some 
propositions as logical, which in fact should not belong to logic11. 
It is also noteworthy that the above Tractarian passage marks the unique 
use of the word “Grammatik” in the entire book. This notion has undoubtedly 
played a central role in the development of his philosophy (see, for instance, 
Hintikka and Hintikka, 1986). In 3.325, “Grammatik” revealingly appears ar-
ticulated with “der logischen Syntax” (not several, but one) and the search for a 
Begriffsschrift. The choice of this word, in a context where Wittgenstein could 
have used “Zeichensprache” or “Notation”, does not seem to be accidental. In 
this context, this direct mention of a “Begriffsschrift” explicitly associates his 
Tractarian logical inquiry with Frege’s and Russell’s search for adequate no-
tational means to explore and advance logic. It is crucial to note here that a 
search for a correct symbolism meant inter alia an attempt at systematically 
avoiding logical nonsense and philosophical confusion.
Accordingly, Ramsey, in his historical 1923 review of the Tractatus, rec-
ognises the Tractarian truth-table notation as an original improvement in 
the expression of dependence between propositions and their operators in 
comparison with the notation of Principia. That Ramsey held the Tractarian 
truth-table notation as an original contribution to logic is consistent with 
11  We will come back to this in the next section.
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the already presented fact that Wittgenstein held it as being his own notation 
and with Shosky (1997) findings. Moreover, Ramsey, in the very reception 
of the Tractatus, correctly held its truth table as an alternative notation with 
a clear philosophical aim and not as a mere mathematical device or a logical 
technique. This is compatible with the Tractarian approach to truth tables I 
am defending to make sense how truth tables capture several features of the 
Tractatus. Despite Ramsey’s appraisal, Wittgenstein, in his Nachlass, expresses 
some consternation because Ramsey could not really fully understand the 
crucial (philosophical) stress he put on symbolism:
Ramsey neither understands the value that I set on a particular notation 
nor the value that I set on a particular word because he does not see that a 
whole point of view [Anschauungsweise] of an object is expressed through 
it, the angle from which I now consider a thing. The notation is the ul-
timate expression of the philosophical intuition [Philosophische An-
schauung]. (Wittgenstein 1994: 165, my translation and emphasis).
Although Wittgenstein did not mention Leibniz in this context, his approach 
to symbolism is relevantly close to the presented Leibnizian ideal of symbolism, 
most likely because of his direct dialogue and dispute with Logicism12. The 
young Wittgenstein rightly followed the logicist tradition represented inter alia 
by Russell’s idea that the grammar of everyday language does not necessarily re-
flect the logical syntax of language and that this can lead us to erroneous analy-
sis13. The search for a notation naturally accompanies the Tractarian project of 
an “excavating” logical approach to language: logical form is usually much more 
complex than we think and is hidden in the “subsoil” of language. As result of 
this perspective, we would need a prospective means to excavate this logical 
form to bring it to the surface. In this context, it is natural to require a notation 
to be the safe thread and criterion for a more adequate logical analysis14.
12  For further discussion on this articulation between Leibniz and Logicism, see Peckhaus 1999.
13  This is to be found in the kind of logical analysis proposed in On Denoting (1905). Russell´s 
innovative method of dissolving ontological mistakes and philosophical illusions, such as the 
Meinongian theory of inconsistent objects, through logical tools and analysis deeply influenced 
several authors in analytic philosophy (the young Wittgenstein as well). For that, see 4.002 and 
4.0031. This seems to be the first and only positive mention of Russell´s work in the whole Trac-
tatus.
14  For further discussion on this point, see Hintikka and Hintikka 1986, chapter V.
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It is also important to emphasise the distinction between excluding errors 
by ameliorating the notational system rather than by improving the language 
itself. According to the Tractatus, language itself should not be corrected; it is 
logically perfect the way it is (5.663). A perfect notation should, then, simply 
bring to the surface this hidden logical form. The project of developing a 
more suitable notation or an instrument for “logical excavation” is pursued 
by Wittgenstein from Notebooks 14-16 through the Tractarian truth tables 
up until (at least) the early 1930s, when he tried to access alternatives that 
could capture the logical multiplicity of phenomena, such as the case of the 
octahedron in relation to the colour system15.
It is well known that an important feature of the Tractarian metaphysics 
of symbolism is that language can represent, in principle, the whole reality, or 
that facts can always be “remitted” to other facts to depict them, but language 
cannot represent what makes this representation possible, i.e., the logical form 
shared by represented and representation (4.12 and 4.121). Accordingly, it is 
legitimate to hold that the Tractarian distinction between saying and showing 
comes, among other things, to fulfil the role of clearly determining the distinc-
tion between representation through description and representation via nota-
tions. Wittgenstein argues that what can be shown cannot be said. Because 
saying corresponds to the sphere of bipolarity, that is, the sphere of sense and 
contingency, it cannot cover the necessary sphere of language, for example, 
the sphere that should be shown by an adequate notation. For instance, that 
all propositions of logic are tautologies, that meaningful propositions should 
be contingent and that language works exclusively truth-functionally should 
all be shown by an adequate notation, although they cannot be stated by lan-
guage. Something necessary within language cannot be formulated meaning-
fully. Rather, it should be evidenced by its syntax. This is clear and desirable in 
this Tractarian period: (the unique) syntax of language that captures the logic 
of world should be systematically exhibited by a notational system. 
The Tractarian search for a correct notational means, or a perfect one, as 
Wittgenstein often maintains in Some Remarks of Logical Form (1929, SRLF), 
for instance) incorporates a Lebnizian view such that it can be used as a 
leitmotif to understand his image of logic. As a result, it is not an accident 
that the truth-table notation shows an appeal to logic as an exclusively neu-
tral field that is completely combinatorial (4.27, 4.28 and 4.442), where no 
15  See, for example, Wittgenstein 1994, pp. 57-60. For further literature on this topic, see Silva 
(2016a and 2016b).
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possibility of combination is excluded (2.012116) and no hierarchies are ex-
pected (5.556). The truth table incorporates the whole paradigm of truth-
functionality (5 and 5.1) and the neutrality of logic (5.551).
2. Wittgenstein’s philosophical introduction of truth tables
By applying this Leibnizian ideal on the metaphysical character of correct 
symbolism in examining, for instance, Notebooks 14-16, we find Wittgen-
stein’s first entry about the notational elements of a language on 26th Novem-
ber 191417. This passage shows a commitment to the belief that an essential 
feature of any legitimate language should be shown in an appropriate nota-
tion. In this particular case, it is demanded that an adequate notation should 
show the internal articulation between positive and negative propositions. A 
correct logical notation should put truth and falsehood at the same level18. 
This relationship between essential aspects of language and the expressive 
capacity of a notation is also evidenced in annotations of 29th November 1914 
with respect to the superfluous nature of identity in a notational system, a 
typical Tractarian issue (3.323, 5.4733, 5.5301, 5.533). 
The demand that the rules of a notation should prevent us from the for-
mulation of pseudo-problems is an old idea in Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
journey. In response to Russell’s letter of 30th October 1913, he makes clear 
that the T-F schemes are articulated “genetically” with another tentative no-
tation developed at this time: “(…) If you had only remembered the WF 
Scheme of ~p you would never have asked this question (I think). In fact all 
rules of the ab symbolism follow directly from the essence of the WF Scheme” 
(1961: p.123). This is Wittgenstein’s (insolent) answer to Russell’s question: 
“If apb is the symbol for p, is bpa the symbol for ~p? And if not, what is?” 
(Wittgenstein 1961: 125). The talk of “an essence” of a symbolism in the 
above passage is also noteworthy, as it may firmly orientate one’s philosophi-
cal questions about logic. 
16  In his early philosophy, Wittgenstein often states that logic should deal with all possibilities 
and that all possibilities are its facts.
17  Wittgenstein 1961, p. 33
18   This logical tenet is also to be found in Wittgenstein´s conversations with Schlick and Wais-
sman from January, 1930: “A negative proposition confers the same multiplicity upon reality as a 
positive one” (Waismann 1979: 85). Or: “Obviously the case is thus: if ´φa´ is possible, then ´~φa´ 
is possible too” (id. ib., p.90).
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In this historical context, this letter to Russell from 30th October 191319 
strongly suggests that Wittgenstein was teaching Russell the use of his nota-
tional means rather than being taught by Russell, as Russell is clearly asking 
Wittgenstein how to operate and interpret some features of the discussed 
notation. Wittgenstein was searching for a proper logical means in the pre-
Tractatus period, and the development of a more adequate notation follows 
the very development of his ideas.
This letter to Russell represents further historical evidence for Shosky’s 
findings and interpretation on the origin of truth tables as a Wittgensteinian 
development (Shosky 1997: 22), despite Anellis’ criticism that Peirce should 
be taken as the real father of truth tables (2004, 2012). In these works, Anellis 
advocates that Peirce should be considered the first to build a diagrammatical 
device for expressing truth-functionality. Nevertheless, if Wittgenstein is not 
the father of truth-table notation, we would have a historically meaningful 
consequence: Ramsey and Russell evidently did not know Peirce’s arguable 
priority because no one mentions Peirce by their public reception of the Trac-
tatus, particularly when they are directly discussing the Tractarian symbolism. 
If Anellis is correct in his historical enterprise, this would mean that some 
of the pillars of analytic philosophy surprisingly overlooked Peirce’s priority.
In another letter to Russell from November 1913, Wittgenstein highlight-
ed the tentative nature of his ab notation or symbolism20, clarifying that it was 
an ongoing search. He was explicitly searching for a “final notation” for cap-
turing logical truths and, accordingly, presented some alternatives to Russell. 
I beg you notice that, although I shall make use in what follows of my ab 
notation, the meaning of this notation is not needed; that is to say, even if 
this notation should turn out not to be the final correct notation what I am 
going to say is valid if you only admit - as I believe you must do - that it is 
a possible notation. (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 127). 
19  This letter is documented in Notebooks 14-16, Appendix III, pp. 122-124.
20  It is outside the scope of our paper to explore the historical and technical articulation of 
this pre-Tractarian ab notation with the Tractarian truth table. However, if we compare some of 
Wittgenstein´s letters from 1913 (for instance, Wittgenstein, 1961. p. 123) with some passages in 
the Tractatus, we shall see that the ab notation mentioned in these letters to Russell is strikingly 
similar to the “unsere Notation” presented in 6.1203. Both should be an “anschauliche Methode”, 
just like truth-table notation, to show that some complex propositions are tautologies.
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The main point seems to be that in all these possible notations, even if 
they were not the final ones, as Wittgenstein acknowledges, some propo-
sitions, which Russell believed were logical truths, such as the axioms of 
infinity and of reducibility, would be shown as not being necessarily true, 
and, hence, not belonging to logic. In this letter, we identify a clear belief 
in the possibility of a typology of propositions made mechanically by a more 
adequate notation compared with the Principia. In a proper notational means, 
Wittgenstein could determine without doubt when a proposition belongs to 
logic or not, being then a contingent (or meaningful) proposition. In this 
proper notation, we would have, as a result, the ultimate (objective) criterion 
for distinguishing empirical propositions from logical ones, that is, empirical 
truths from logical ones, without surprises. 
Accordingly, Wittgenstein states: “I can sum up by saying that a logical 
proposition is one the special cases of which are either tautologous – and 
then the proposition is true – or self-contradictory (as I shall call it) and 
then it is false. And the ab notation simply shows directly which of these 
two it is (if any).” (1961: 125). The search for an adequate notation naturally 
completes, in this sense, Wittgenstein’s criticism of the logical status of some 
axioms of the Principia. This letter to Russell from 1913 is also notoriously 
consistent with the Tractarian image of logic, shown especially in the Tracta-
tus passages 6.1 to 6.13.
To say that a proposition is a tautology is to say that it belongs to logic. To 
say that a proposition belongs to logic is to say that it is a tautology. If one 
can calculate whether a proposition is a tautology, or recognise it when it is 
a long, complex proposition (6.1262), one can fully calculate whether any 
proposition belongs to logic. This idea is the announcement of the project 
of the truth-table notation as another decision procedure to be fulfilled in 
the Tractatus. In his letter to Russell in 1913, Wittgenstein delivers a “user-
friendly” guide for the use of his ab notation and the interpretation of its 
results21. This is crucial for our investigation on the philosophical origin of 
the truth table as a notation: with a correct symbolic rule, one could calculate 
whether a proposition belongs to logic or not. Wittgenstein goes on, in this 
letter, teaching Russell how to use this notational rule. He provides Russell a 
test of the “logicality” of some axioms of the Principia22.
21  Wittgenstein 1961: 125.
22  Wittgenstein 1961: 126.
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Some axioms of the Principia would not be able to pass this test, so they 
could not be held as purely logical because they would be “accidentally” true 
and not “essentially” true. At this point, it is important to emphasise that 
the critique begins with the urge of radically separating logical truths from 
empirical truths. This criticism gives the philosophical motivation of estab-
lishing an adequate notation also as a criterion for meaningfulness, as contin-
gent propositions are the only meaningful ones because if they are true, they 
are “accidentally” true. That is, they should not belong to logic because logic 
should be composed solely by necessary truth, as the young Wittgenstein 
saw it. We could have, then, a more rigorous criterion for logic than mere 
evidence or generality (6.1231-6.1233). 
A correct symbolism could substitute the insistence of a very vague (and 
in some sense mentalist) criterion for logic: the degree of evidence (Grad des 
Einleuchtens). The ultimate criterion for what logic should be brought into 
objective notational considerations, as can be read here: “Self-evidence, of 
which Russell has said so much, can only be discarded in logic by language 
itself preventing every logical mistake. That logic is a priori consists in the 
fact that we cannot think illogically.” (5.4731)23.
Accordingly, in his review of the Tractatus, Ramsey (1923) suggests that 
Wittgenstein was searching for a perfect language:
However, in a perfect language in which each thing had its own one name, 
that in the sense of a sentence a certain object occurred, would also be 
shown visibly by the occurrence in the sentence of the name of that object; 
and this might be expected to happen with regard to all internal properties 
of senses; that one sense, for example, is contained in another (i.e., one 
proposition follows from another) might always appear visibly in the sen-
tences expressing them. (This is nearly achieved in Mr. Wittgenstein´s T 
notation). Thus in a perfect language all sentences or thoughts would 
be perfectly clear. (p. 476, our emphasis)
There is no problem in speaking, as Ramsey does in the passage above, of a 
perfect language in the Tractatus if we hold it as a search for a perfect notation 
to express the already perfect logical syntax of current language (5.5563). 
Wittgenstein himself strongly indicates in SRLF that he was still searching for 
23  This passage is echoed in a revealing criticism to Frege in 6.1271 about advocating evidence 
as a criterion for logic, which we will discuss in a further section.
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a “perfect notation” by the time of his return to philosophy in 1929 because 
his notation was unable to rule out nonsensical constructions24 (p.170). The 
search for a better expression of certain logical relations through a more ad-
equate artificial language becomes clear when we assume that if a satisfactory 
notation were to be developed, it should guide us in the way of contemplating 
and acknowledging (exhaustively) logical truths (in the Tractatus, tautologies 
as shown in 6.1). Thus, one would not need to postulate logical truths. One 
should only be able to build a correct system of signs, the construction rules 
for which could systematically reflect the syntactic rules of our language or 
of any possible language. Such an approach is clearly advocated by Wittgen-
stein in the Tractatus: “Whence it follows that we can get on without logical 
propositions, for we can recognise in an adequate notation the formal properties 
of the propositions by mere inspection.” (6.122, my emphasis).
According to this symbolic ideal, one may have every logical truth if one 
construct a proper notation: “It now becomes clear why we often feel as 
though “logical truths must be “postulated” by us. We can in fact postulate 
them in so far as we can postulate an adequate notation” (6.1223). We would 
then need an ideal notation to reveal the deep syntactic rules of our language 
so that linguistic confusion could be systematically avoided because a poor 
application or use of language could be automatically denounced by inspect-
ing the use of our notation. This should be clearly visible through the misuse 
of the notational system25.
In the Tractatus, the adequacy of the structural symbolic power of a sym-
bolic system in relation to the symbolised domain appears in the sequence 
of passages 3.33 - 3.334. The notational system does not need to address 
the meaning or semantics of its signs: it needs only to assume that these 
must stand for something. Through its descriptive power, the symbolism can 
24  Ironically, the same kind of critique he made against Frege’s and Russell’s notations in 1918, 
presented in the Tractarian passage 3.325, can be used against his own notation. An adequate 
notation should make it impossible to judge nonsense (cf. 5.5422). His truth-table notation, as 
he acknowledges in his SRLF (1929, p.171), is unable to do that. For further discussion on this 
topic, see Silva 2016a and 2016b.
25  To see how visual aspects in this inspection are important to this notational discussion com-
pare 6.1203 and 6.1223; see also Ramsey 1923, pp. 176-7.
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capture the combinatorial possibilities of external elements to the notation26. 
Wittgenstein believed this to be one of Russell’s (many) errors: Russell started 
to talk about the meaning of signs to establish his symbolism. Subsequently, 
for Wittgenstein, language is not entirely ineffable. The semantic relations of 
a language may remain ineffable, but its syntactic structure should be system-
atically revealed by the rules of a correct notational system. Accordingly, by 
using the seminal distinction between language as a calculus and language 
as a universal medium introduced by van Heijenoort in 1967, Hintikka & 
Hintikka maintain that: 
All that a believer in language as the universal medium can do in his or her 
logic is to speak of the words and other symbols of language, abstracted 
from their semantical function. In brief, he or she is led to a purely formal-
istic conception of logic by a syntax of language as purely formal enterprise 
can be motivated in two entirely different ways. (…) The inexpressability 
is confined to the semantics of our language and its structure. In contrast, 
the syntax of language can be expressed and discussed in language. And in 
fact, the views expressed in the Tractatus amount to a strong incentive to 
study “the logical syntax of language”. (pp. 10-11).
Thus, Wittgenstein was forced to take a purely syntactic or formal approach 
to language because the semantic sphere of the investigation was banned. 
This partial possibility of meta-language involved precisely the set-up of a 
notation representing the structural rules of language. We can tackle the rules 
of formation, and of syntactic articulations of language, particularly when we 
address the development of a notational system, as logical features are shown 
by the rules that govern the manipulation of signs. Wittgenstein here is quite 
consistent with his early philosophical enterprise. Because we cannot state 
anything about the essence of language and the world, the attempt to show it 
by the ruled-construction of complex symbols in a more adequate notational 
means is a natural consequence.
26  This represents an interesting dislocation of the Tractarian picture theory into discussions 
about notation, as we can also have a kind of “extrapolation” of results from one domain to another. 
For example, we can see in a Bild what should be the case for the Bild being true. Here, from 
the rules of construction of a notational system, we understand the rules of a particular logical 
domain that is expressed by this notation. In both cases, we demand the same logical multiplicity 
(4.011) between that which represents (Bild or notation) and that which is represented (a state of 
affairs or a logical domain).
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3. On a Secularised Use and a Metaphysical Use of Truth Tables
Several interesting technical features and applications of truth tables in our 
current handbooks appear in the Tractatus (whether directly or indirectly). 
Such truth table features include the definition of operators by their truth 
conditions, algorithmic power at the propositional level, completeness27, pos-
sibility to test for consistency or for semantic equivalence of some proposi-
tions (i.e., when they have the same truth values in all possible interpreta-
tions), as well as tests of the validity and invalidity of some arguments (i.e., 
where the truth of the premises imposes the truth of the conclusion). These 
are features of a secularised use of truth tables: it is not necessary to be engaged 
in any peculiar metaphysical search for the essence of language or world to legiti-
mately explore this logical machinery.
In general, the truth table is seen as the only possible positive contribu-
tion from the iconic (and misleading28) Tractarian logic to contemporary logic 
exhausted in the notion of tautology (Beziau 2012). In the Tractarian period, 
Wittgenstein argues that his notation can be an alternative to the notation of 
the Principia to symbolise molecular propositions and to reveal the logic of 
our language. As Wittgenstein saw things at that time, the truth table itself 
should be held as a propositional symbol even before being an algorithm 
(4.44-4.442). Moreover, it is because the truth table is an adequate proposi-
tional symbol that it turns out to be an algorithm in the sense that we could 
27  As Floyd (2007) states: “The truth table is an imagined diagram of the constraints that would 
lay into conceptual place a notion of logical consequence. What we may be left with saying is 
that Wittgenstein vastly underestimated how complicated the idealization and rigorization of the 
notion of logical consequence would turn out to be. He had the idea of, or instinct for, the com-
pleteness of logic, but without any of the techniques.” (Floyd 2007: 211)
28  For example, Wittgenstein holds in the Tractatus: “it is the characteristic mark of logical 
propositions that one can perceive in the symbol alone that they are true; and this fact contains 
in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And so also it is one of the most important facts that the 
truth or falsehood of non-logical propositions cannot be recognized from the propositions alone.” 
6.113. Compare also his discourse towards a “method” in a letter to Russell from 1913 (p.125, 
1961). In a sense, his image of logic marks both the success and the failure of the Tractatus. If logic 
happens to be fully reduced to tautologies and one develops a decision procedure to recognize 
them by purely mechanical means, we can understand why Wittgenstein really thought he solved 
all problems (im Wesentlichen) in his first book. It is highly controversial to hold Church’s Theorem 
as a technical refutation of the Tractarian thesis that every logical propositional could be, by the 
symbol itself, recognized as such. To what extent can a technical result refute a philosophical sys-
tem? Perhaps it can indeed refute only the part of a philosophical system that presents technical 
intentions. Nonetheless, I believe that, if confronted with this alleged refutation, Wittgenstein 
would say that nothing about his philosophy had been properly understood (as usual).
139Could Wittgenstein still be held as a father of truth tables?
O que nos faz pensar, Rio de Janeiro, v.25, n.39, p.123-146, jul.-dez. 2016
always calculate whether a complex proposition is a tautology or not. That 
is, it was by approaching the truth table as a more adequate logical nota-
tion than that from the Principia, for example, that Wittgenstein gained this 
far-reaching possibility of exhaustively classifying propositions as tautologies, 
contradictions and contingencies. This constitutes the ultimate criterion of 
the expressive legitimacy of complex propositions: if a complex proposition 
shows itself to be a contingent one, it is a meaningful proposition.
A further example of a central feature of the Tractatus that is embodied 
(not accidentally) by truth tables is the strong compositionality or truth-
functionality. Every proposition is either elementary or should be analysed 
uniquely in terms of elementary propositions (Tractatus 5 and 6), for if we 
have a determined base, the complexity shall be fully determined from it. In 
other words, any complexity should be reduced exhaustively in terms of an 
elementary base. This can also be seen in the demand for a complete and 
unambiguous analysis of complex propositions in terms of elementary ones 
(3.25). This compositionality incorporated in the truth-table notation shows 
the role of elementary propositions in determining that the analysis has a 
logical end. We do not need further logical analysis if this limit is reached. 
This reveals inter alia why we write a proposition as, say, ‘p’ both in the sec-
ularised version of our handbooks and in the Tractarian truth tables (4.24). In 
so doing, we do not have to be concerned about what is involved inside these 
propositions. That is, writing a proposition, regardless of what it is about, with 
a ‘p’ implies, among other things, that the internal complexity of the proposi-
tion (its internal elements and their constitution) is logically irrelevant for the 
analysis. Speaking in Tractarian terms, if a proposition is composed solely of 
simple names, it is logically irrelevant to know either what these names are or 
how many of them there are (5.553 – 5.556). If elementary propositions are 
indeed legitimate, the complex construed through it should also be legitimate. 
The combinatorial possibilities of molecular propositions are indifferent to the 
components that occur within the elementary propositions (5.101 and 6). The 
construction of complexity would then be entirely combinatorial (4.27, 4.28 
and 4.442). Neither in the Tractatus nor in our secularised usages of truth 
tables is any logical relation or interaction among elementary propositions to 
be expected. The first lines in a truth table represent all possible combinations 
of truth conditions among elementary propositions29.
29  This represents precisely what the Color Exclusion Problem comes to deny. For further discussion 
on this central topic, see Hintikka and Hintikka, 1986, Von Wright, 1996 and Silva 2016a, 2016b.
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We now examine bipolarity30 because it seems to be a guide for notational 
rules in both the metaphysical and secularised uses of truth tables. The el-
ementary propositions, at the end of analysis, must be capable of being true 
and false. This ‘and’ is crucial for our argument. There cannot be a case in 
which a proposition has either uniquely true (T) or uniquely false (F) already 
in the first columns of a truth table as its possible values, where we distribute 
the truth-values. This “error” would be enough to indicate that either the 
decomposition or the distribution of truth-values was not completely and/or 
correctly executed. This “notational fact” mirrors the essential bipolarity of 
propositions as a criterion of meaningfulness, that is, of propositional sense. 
In a Tractarian context, T and F are the only possible truth-values ascribable 
to propositions. They are exclusive and exhaustive – there is no third alter-
native. Moreover, there is no lack of truth-value, and at an elementary level, 
each truth-value should appear only once. As a result, from a Tractarian point 
of view, signs such as the following for a elementary proposition ‘p’ would be 
logical nonsense and could (and should) be recognised as nonsense just by 
visually inspecting them: ‘(TTF) p’, ‘(FFT) p’, ‘(T) p’, ‘(F) p’, ‘(_) p’ or ‘(TFI) 
p’, where ‘(_)’ would mean a lack of truth value and ‘I’ any third truth value. 
We use here the “deutliche Notation” suggested in 4.442. 
Accordingly, the correct sign for an elementary proposition should be 
‘(TF) p’. Recall that we are dealing with an ideal in which a notational system 
should be able to capture the logical rules of language. This reflects the re-
quirement that the alleged deep syntax of language should be systematically 
reflected by a perspicuous notation. As a desired result, nonsensical construc-
tions should be avoided by a simple inspection of truth-table notation.
In truth-table notation, when we bring a molecular proposition to its 
atomic basis, we assign the values T and F to each proposition, that is, not 
only true and not only false and no other values. In a fully secularised use, 
when we set up our truth tables in propositional calculus, we, in several 
relevant cases, oblige our atomic base to be bipolar, i.e., to exhibit the two 
30  In Waismann (1979), Wittgenstein states: “Every proposition is essentially true-false. Thus 
a proposition has two poles (corresponding to case of its truth and case of its falsity). We call 
this the sense of a proposition.” p. 94. The radicalization of bipolarity with the abandonment of 
existent negative facts is the answer to Wittgenstein´s problems with the negation in his Notebooks 
period (cf. Wittgenstein 1961, see entries of November, 24th and 25th 1914). Accordingly, the 
Tractarian uses of negative facts should be held as being merely terminological (such as in 2.06), 
as “sein Grundgedanke” rejects that negation could add up anything to a proposition. Ultimately, 
the application of negation should impose no mystery, as its representation in truth tables shows. 
We will come back to this topic.
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possible poles true and false. In this sense, it is crucial to note that we do not 
insist that they be just bivalent: they must be bipolar. They have to show the 
two poles. To show at least one pole is consistent with being bivalent, but 
not with being bipolar. Even today, this procedure is still entirely Tractarian. 
To write down the possibilities of truth-values as T and F and not just T or F, 
as the basis of the construction of the truth table, is the very diagrammatic 
representation of the Tractarian bipolarity. In other words, it represents the 
requirement for contingency at the elementary basis. That is, the contingency 
or bipolarity is the ultimate mark (or requirement) of propositional legiti-
macy at the end of analysis.
It is crucial to note that classical bivalence is weak for the Tractatus. Bi-
valence requires that every proposition must be true or false. In terms of 
legitimacy of propositions, the bivalence makes no relevant distinction be-
tween a tautology and a true proposition or between a contradiction and a 
false proposition. Both tautologies and contradictions belong to the language 
syntax (4.46). Now, if we presuppose that propositions must be able to be 
true and false, as the tautology is a proposition that, by definition, can only 
be true and a contradiction, or a proposition that can only be false, we have, 
then, trivially that they would not be, strictly speaking, propositions. That 
is, if in addition to bivalence we require bipolarity, tautologies cannot be 
propositions because they cannot be false. Conversely, contradictions cannot 
be propositions either because contradictions can never be true. Bipolarity 
is a much stricter criterion for propositional sense than bivalence. Bivalence 
states that any proposition is either true or false while bipolarity maintains 
that any atomic proposition must be capable of being true and false. Stating 
something, a bipolar proposition, is to set the subject within this expectation 
of truth and falsity. Nothing resembling a legitimate and necessary proposi-
tion (with sense) can exist. In fact, calling a proposition legitimate was redun-
dant for the young Wittgenstein. By definition, propositions should always be 
legitimate. This is clearly distinct from the Fregean view (5.4733).
More specifically, with regard to the status of logic, we still have the ex-
egetical superiority of holding truth-tables as a notational means. See the 
claim that propositions of logic are tautologies (6.1). In his review of 1923, 
Ramsey emphasises two achievements: i) to recognise that logical truths are 
tautologies and ii) to build up a notational system in which we separate them 
from empirical truths:
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So every proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions, and 
many differently constructed propositional signs are the same proposition 
because, expressing agreement and disagreement with the same truth-
possibilities, they have the same sense and are the same truth function of 
elementary propositions. (…) There are two extreme cases of great impor-
tance; if we express disagreement with all the truth-possibilities we get a 
contradiction, if agreement with them all, a tautology, which says nothing. 
The propositions of logic are tautologies and to have made clear this, 
their essential characteristic, is a remarkable achievement. (p.471, 
our emphasis)
As another consequence of logic being built up through tautologies is that 
it should be objectively recognised by examining the symbol itself, where 
a truth table could be held as a decision procedure, as, for instance, Dre-
ben & Floyd (1991) defend. This means that if our image of logic is domi-
nated exhaustively by tautologies, we may consequently have a mechanism 
of fully ascribing a proposition to logic or to the factual descriptions. The 
completeness in the exhaustive typology of the propositions (tautological, 
contradictory, contingent) can be read as a strong Tractarian thesis. In line 
with the young Wittgenstein, we could hold that the correct classification of 
syntactically well-formed propositions would be tautological, contradictory 
and legitimate ones because contingency was a criterion for determining the 
propositional legitimacy, i.e., if a proposition could not be true and false or if 
it failed to present the two poles of truth values, it could not be considered 
legitimate. Something in it had failed (6.53). The accent in the Tractatus was 
not on contingency, as we mark it in a secularised use, but, as we have seen, 
in legitimacy, the main test for which was bipolarity. 
Another relevant point that usually receives attention from Wittgenstein 
scholars, but not from the recent discussion about truth tables, is that for 
him, logical operators should denote nothing in reality (sein Grundgedanke 
cf. 4.0312). Logical operators should not affect the logical multiplicity of 
propositions, the bars in the truth table, or the parentheses in conventional 
notations (4.441, 5.46-5.4611). Logical connectives are, rather, abbreviated 
signs. Contrary to a typical Fregean realism (6.1271), logical connectives 
would not replace anything in reality, as they would only express possible 
combinations that were already informed in the elementary propositions. It is 
not an accident that all usual logical connectives can be defined by the truth-
table notation. Reading this thesis in the Tractatus, we can clarify, for instance, 
the functioning of denial. As Wittgenstein categorically states, for instance, in 
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5.2341, the negation should invert the sense of a proposition. This should 
happen because negation simply inverts the truth conditions of the denied 
proposition. This alleged trivial fact about any proposition is clear in the 
truth table31. It expresses the negation of a proposition ‘(T,F) p’, as ‘(F,T) p’. 
This representation of negation shows diagrammatically what happens with p 
when p is denied. Negation should then invert the sense of p by inverting its 
truth conditions. What made p true before the negation turns out to make it 
false after it; what made it false turns out to make it true. 
Arriving at a final positive topic explored by us in the Tractatus, we have 
a strong (and controversial) assumption of the independence of elementary 
propositions. An elementary proposition can never exclude another. Exclu-
sion appears only at a level of complexity where there is an operation (or, 
more precisely, the repetition of an element and its denial). In this way, be-
cause there are no operators in the elementary basis of language, it cannot 
contain exclusions. According to 5.1241, every proposition that contradicts 
another denies that proposition, i.e., there are no propositions that contradict 
each other or exclude themselves, without entailing a negation. In this way, 
the logical product of p and q does not generate a contradiction if p and q 
are elementary. In other words, if the logical product generates contradic-
tions, p and q are not elementary. The logical exclusion is a clear case of a 
negative criterion for evaluating whether propositions are elementary or not 
(6.3751). This is a presupposition about the truth tables that is also made ob-
vious by our secularised practices: elementary propositions must be logically 
independent of each other. It is not by chance that this “notational fact” fully 
represents a well-known Tractarian feature. In the clear case of conjunction, 
we must have as the last column “TFFF (p, q)”. Nothing like “FFFF (p, q)” 
may be accepted in a conjunction of elementary propositions. This would 
be sufficient to indicate that at some level (even, for example, if we do not 
know exactly which one) the propositions are not elementary because they 
still comprise some form of exclusion. At the elementary level, there should 
be no exclusion. The propositions must therefore be independent (this idea is 
stated in 5.134 and its ontological counterpart, 5.135). As above, p and q can 
only be excluded truth-functionally if q can be analysed in terms of a denial 
31  Ramsey (1927), in discussing the meaning of “not” and how p and not-p should be related 
in a truth-functional way, states: “This could, of course, only be used as definition of “not” in a 
symbolism based directly on the truth-possibilities. Thus in the notation explained on page 95 of 
Mr. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, we could define “not-P” as the symbol obtained 
by interchanging the T´s and blanks in the last column of “P”.” (p. 166).
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of p or if p can be read in terms of the negation of q. In the Tractatus, the ex-
clusion is the hallmark of a disobedience of essential bipolarity of language: a 
state of affairs must be able to be the case and also not be the case. 
Conclusion
The search for notational means is not just something important or adequate 
when talking about the young Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: this is essential for 
his philosophical program. To operate with truth tables is to operate with 
several tenets of the Tractarian image of logic, even if Wittgenstein was not 
the first to think of it as a logical device or as a mathematical matrix of truth 
values. It is indeed by the privilege of this Tractarian notation in the concep-
tual framework that we can understand several tenets of his early project as 
well as explain the strong metaphysical commitments of the truth table in 
its Tractarian origin. This metaphysical commitment, as an account of the 
essence of world and language, is unfortunately not contemplated by the 
secularised use of truth tables dominant in our manuals of logic and in the 
recent discussion on its origins. Wittgenstein did not see truth tables only as 
a means of defining the logical operators or an algorithmic possibility of an 
exhaustive typology of complex propositions in a tautological, contradictory 
and contingent sense. He also saw them as a notational means: as a more ad-
equate expression of propositions. For him, truth tables were an alternative 
(and superior) notational means to other Zeichensprachen or Begriffsschrifte.
In fact, Wittgenstein thought of truth tables as a metaphysical tool that 
should give us an arguably exhaustive map of the articulations of a logical 
space thought of as absolute, eternal, without competitors and shared by 
both language and world. I hold these Tractarian tenets as metaphysical be-
cause they are all based on an alleged unique essence of language and world. 
While Wittgenstein may not have been the first philosopher to conceive of a 
truth table, he was most likely the first to use it in association with a substan-
tive and far-reaching philosophical program on the nature of language and 
the essence of the world.
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